Showing posts with label Greek bailout. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greek bailout. Show all posts

Saturday, November 18, 2017

18/11/17: ECB Induces Double Error in the EU Policy Markets


In economics, two key market asymmetries/biases lead to the severe reduction in markets efficiency often marking the departure from theoretical levels of efficiency (speed, with which markets incorporate new relevant information into pricing decisions of markets agents) and the practical outcomes. These asymmetries or biases are: information asymmetry and agency problem.

For those, uninitiated into econospeak, information asymmetry (sometimes referred to as information failure), is a situation, in which one party to an economic transaction possesses greater knowledge of facts, material or relevant to the decision, than the other party. For example, a seller may know hidden information about a car on offer that is not revealed to the buyer. In more extreme example, a seller might actively conceal such information from a buyer. This can happen when a seller 'prepares' the car for sale by cleaning the engine, thus removing leaks and accumulations of oil and / or coolant that can indicate the areas where the problems might be.

The agency problem, also referred to as principal-agent problem, arises when an agent, acting on behalf of the principal, has distinct set of incentives from the principal. The resulting risk is that the agent will act in self-interest to undermine the goals and objectives of the principal. An example here would be a real estate agent contracted by the seller, while taking a commission kickback from the buyer. Or vice versa.

Occasionally, both problems combine to produce an even more powerful distortionary result, pushing the markets further away from finding a 'true' (or fundamentals-justified) price point.

Today, we have an example of such interaction. As reported in Euractiv, the ECB has denied the EU Court of Auditors access to data on Greek bailout. (Full story here: http://www.euractiv.com/section/all/news/ecb-denies-eu-auditors-access-to-information-on-greek-bailouts/) The claimed justification: banking secrecy. The result:

  1. There is now clearly an asymmetry in information between the EU, the Court of Auditors, and the ECB when it comes to assessing the ECB actions in the Greek bailout(s). The 'car salesman' (the ECB) has scrubbed out information about the 'vehicle' (the bailout(s)) when presenting it to the 'buyer' and is refusing to show any evidence on pre-scrubbed 'car'.
  2. And there is an agency problem. The ECB is an agent for the EU (and thus an agent relative to the principal - the EU Court of Auditors, which represents the interest of the EU). As an agent, the ECB has a contractual obligation to act in the interest of the EU. But as a part of the Troika in the case of the Greek bailout(s), the ECB is also contracted into a set of incentives to act in concert with other players: the sub-set of the EU, namely the EU Commission and the EFSF/ESM funds, and the IMF. At least one of these agents, the IMF, has a strong incentives to avoid transparent discovery of information about the Greek bailout(s) because these bailout(s) have, potentially, violated the IMF by-laws in lending to distressed countries. Another agent, the EU Commission, has an incentive to conceal the truth about the same bailout(s) in order to sustain a claim that the Greek bailout(s) are(were) a success. The third set of the agents (various EU funds that backed the bailout(s)) has incentives to sustain the pretence that the Greek bailout(s) were within the funds' bylaws and did not constitute state aid to the insolvent government.
In simple terms, the ECB refusal to release information on Greek bailout(s) to the EU Court of Auditors is a fundamental violation of the entire concept of the common market principle that overrides any other consideration, including the consideration of monetary policy independence. This so because the action of the ECB induces two most basic, most fundamental failures into the market: the agency problem and the asymmetric information problem, which are (even when taken independently from each other) the core drivers for market failures.



Tuesday, May 24, 2016

23/5/16: Greek Debt Sustainability and IMF's Pipe Dreams


IMF outlined its position on Greek debt sustainability, once again stressing the fact - known to everyone with an ounce of brain left untouched by Eurohopium injections from Brussels and Frankfurt : Greek debt is currently unsustainable.

Here are some details of the IMF’s latest encounter with reality:

Firstly, per IMF: Greek “debt was deemed sustainable, but not with high probability, when the first program was adopted in May 2010. Public debt was projected to surge from 115 percent of GDP to a peak of 150 percent of GDP, primarily because the expected internal devaluation implied declining nominal GDP while fiscal deficits were expected to add to the debt burden, but also because of the decision to forgo a private sector debt restructuring (PSI).”

Several things to note here. The extent of internal devaluation required for Greece is a function of several aspects of Euro area policies, most notably, lack of functional independent currency that can absorb - via normal devaluation - some of the shocks; lack of will on behalf of the EU to restructure official debt owed by Greece to EFSF/ESM pair of European institutions and to the ECB; and effective capture of virtually all Greek ‘assistance’ funds within the banking sector and external financing sector, with zero trickle down from these sectors funding to the real economy. In other words, there were plenty of sources for Greek debt non-sustainability arising from EU construct and policies.

Secondly, “the much deeper-than-expected recession necessitated significant debt relief in 2011-12 to maintain the prospect of restoring sustainability. Private creditors accepted large haircuts;… European partners provided very large NPV relief by extending maturities and reducing and deferring interest payments; and Fund maturities were lengthened…”

Which, of course is rather ironic. Lack of functional mechanisms for the recovery in the Greek case included, in addition to those internal to the Greek economic institutions, also the three factors outlined above. In other words, de facto, 2011-2012 restructuring of debt was, at least in part, compensatory measures for exogenous drivers of the Greek crisis. The EU paid for its own poor institutional set up.

However, as IMF notes, “European partners also pledged to provide additional debt relief—if needed—to meet specific debt-to-GDP targets (of 124 percent by 2020 and well under 110 percent by 2022). Critically for the DSA, the Greek government at the time insisted — supported by its European partners — on preserving the very ambitious targets for growth, the fiscal surplus, and privatization, arguing that there was broad political support for the underlying policies.”

Oh dear, per IMF, therefore (and of course the Fund is correct here), the idiocy of shooting Greece in both feet was of not only European making, but also of Greek making. No kidding: Greek own Governments have insisted (and continue to insist) on internecine, unrealistic and outright stupid targets that even the IMF is feeling nauseous about.

“Serious implementation problems caused a sharp deterioration in sustainability, raising fresh doubts about the realism of policy assumptions, especially from mid–2014. The authorities’ hoped-for broad political support for the program did not materialize…  causing long delays in concluding reviews, with only 5 of 16 originally scheduled reviews eventually completed. The problems mounted from mid-2014, with across-the-board reversals after the change of government in early-2015. Staff’s revised DSA—published in June 2015—suggested that the agreed debt targets for 2020-2022 would be missed by over 30 percent of GDP.”

This is clinical. Pre-conditions for August 2015 Bailout 3.0 were set by a combination of external (EU-driven) and internal (domestic politics-driven) factors that effectively confirmed the absolute absurdity of the whole programme. Yes, the IMF is trying to walk away now from sitting at the very same table where all of this transpired. And yes, the IMF deserves to be placed onto the second tier of blame here. Blame is due nonetheless, as the Fund could have attempted to seriously force the EU hand on changing the programme on a number of occasions, but it continued to support the Greek programme, broadly, even while issuing caveats.

But give a cheer to the Tsipras’ Government utter senility: “Critically, …the new government insisted—like its predecessor—that it could garner political support for the necessary underlying reforms.”


And now onto new stuff.

Per IMF’s today’s note: “developments since last summer suggest that a realignment of critical policy and DSA assumptions can no longer be deferred if the DSA is to remain credible. While there certainly has been progress in some areas under the new program that was put in place in August 2015 with support by the ESM, and growth and primary balance out-turns last year were better than expected, the government has not been able to mobilize political support for the overall pace of reforms that would be required to retain the June 2015 DSA’s still ambitious assumptions of a dramatic, rapid, and sustained improvement in productivity and fiscal performance. In all key policy areas—fiscal, financial sector stability, labor, product and service markets—the authorities’ current policy plans fall well short of what would be required to achieve their ambitious fiscal and growth targets.”

Pardon me here, but I seriously doubt the primary problem is with the Greek Government inability to mobilize political support. Actually, the real problem is that the entire framework is so full of imaginary numbers, that any Government in any state of political leadership will have zero chance at delivering on these projections. Yes, the Greeks are blessed with a Government that would’t be able to replace a battery in a calculator, but now, even with fresh batteries no calculator would be able to solve the required growth equations.

So, we have the IMF conclusion: “Consequently, staff believes that a realignment of assumptions with the evident political and social constraints on the pace and scope of adjustment is needed”. In more common parlance, the IMF has to revise its model assumptions as follows:

Primary surplus (aka - austerity):  The IMF recognizes that current tax rates are already too high in Greece (that’s right, the IMF actually finds Greek tax targets to be self-defeating), while expenditure cuts have been ad hoc, as opposed to structural. Thus, with “…tax compliance rates falling precipitously and discretionary spending already severely compressed, staff believes that the additional adjustment needed to allow Greece to run sustained primary surpluses over the long run can only be achieved if based on measures to broaden the tax base and lowering outlays on wages and pensions, which by now account for as much as 75 percent primary spending… This suggests that it is unrealistic to assume that Greece can undertake the additional adjustment of 4½ percent of GDP needed to base the DSA on a primary surplus of 3½ percent of GDP.”

This is bad. And it is direct. But IMF wants to make an even stronger point to get through the thick skulls of Greek authorities and their EU masters: “Even if Greece through a heroic effort could temporarily reach a surplus close to 3½ percent of GDP, few countries have managed to reach and sustain such high levels of primary balances for a decade or more, and it is highly unlikely that Greece can do so considering its still weak policy
making institutions and projections suggesting that unemployment will remain at double digits for several decades.” ‘Heroic’ efforts - even in theory - are not enough anymore, says the IMF. I would suggest they were never enough. But, hey, let’s not split hairs.

So to make things more ‘realistic’, the IMF estimates that primary surplus long run target should be 1.5 percent of GDP - full half of the previously required. Still, even this lower target is highly uncertain (per IMF) as it will require extraordinary discipline from the current and future Greek governments. Personally, I doubt Greece will be able to run even that surplus target for longer than 5 years before sliding into its ‘normal’ pattern of spending money it doesn’t have.

Growth (aka illusionary holy grail of debt/GDP ratios):  “Staff believes that the continued absence of political support for a strong and broad
acceleration of structural reforms suggests that it is no longer tenable to base the DSA on the assumption that Greece can quickly move from having one of the lowest to having the highest productivity growth rates in the eurozone.”

Reasons for doom? 

  1. “…the bank recapitalization completed in 2015 was not accompanied by an upfront governance overhaul to overcome longstanding problems, including susceptibility to political interference in bank management. …in the absence of more forceful actions by regulators, and in view of the exceptionally large level of NPLs [non-performing loans] and high share of Deferred Tax Assets in bank capital, banks will be burdened by very weak balance sheets for years to come, suggesting that they will be unable to provide credit to the economy on a scale needed to support very ambitious growth targets.” There are several problems with this assessment. One: credit creation is unimaginable in the Greek economy today even if the banks were fully reformed because there is no domestic demand and because absent currency devaluation there is also no external demand. Two: despite a massive (95%+ of all bailout funds) injection into the banking sector, Greek NPLs remain unresolved. In a way, the EU simply wasted all the money without achieving anything real in the Greek case.
  2. lack of structural reforms in the collective dismissals and industrial action frameworks “and the still extremely gradual pace at which Greece envisages to tackle its pervasive restrictions in product and service markets are also not consistent with the very ambitious growth assumptions”.

So, on the net, “against this background, staff has lowered its long-term growth assumption to 1¼ percent… Here as well the revised assumption remains ambitious in as much as it assumes steadfastness in implementing reforms that exceeds the experience to date, such that Greece would converge to the average productivity growth in the euro-zone over the long-term.”


So how bad are the matters, really, when it comes to Greek debt sustainability?

Per IMF: “Under staff’s baseline assumptions, there is a substantial gap between projected
outcomes and the sustainability objectives … The revised projections suggest that debt will be around 174 percent of GDP by 2020, and 167 percent by 2022. …Debt is projected to decline gradually to just under 160 percent by 2030 as the output gap closes, but trends upwards thereafter, reaching around 250 percent of GDP by 2060, as the cost of debt, which rises over time as market financing replaces highly subsidized official sector financing, more than offsets the debt-reducing effects of growth and the primary balance surplus”.

A handy chart to compare current assessment against June 2015 bombshell that almost exploded the Bailout 3.0


As a result of the above revised estimates/assumptions: a “substantial reprofiling of the terms of European loans to Greece is thus required to bring GFN down by around 20 percent of GDP by 2040 and an additional 20 percent by 2060,…based on a combination of three measures..:

  • Maturity extensions: An extension of maturities for EFSF, ESM and GLF loans of, up to 14 years for EFSF loans, 10 years for ESM loans, and 30 years for GLF loans could reduce the GFN and debt ratios by about 7 and 25 percent of GDP by 2060 respectively. However, this measure alone would be insufficient to restore sustainability.
  • …Extending the deferrals on debt service further could help reduce GFN further by 17 percent of GDP by 2040 and 24 percent by 2060, and …could lower debt by 84 percent of GDP by 2060 (This would imply an extension of grace periods on existing debt ranging from 6 years on ESM loans to 17 and 20 years for EFSF and GLF loans, respectively, as well as an extension of the current deferral on interest payments on EFSF loans by a further 17 years together with interest deferrals on ESM and GLF loans by up to 24 years). However, even in this case, GFN would exceed 20 percent by 2050, and debt would be on a rising path.
  • To ensure that debt can remain on a downward path, official interest rates would need to be fixed at low levels for an extended period, not exceeding 1½ percent until 2040. …Adding this measure to the two noted above helps to reduce debt by 53 percent of GDP by 2040 and 151 percent by 2060, and GFN by 22 percent by 2040 and 39 percent by 2060, which satisfies the sustainability objectives noted earlier”.

So, in the nutshell, to achieve - theoretical - sustainability even under rather optimistic assumptions and with unprecedented (to-date) efforts at structural reforms, Greece requires a write-off of some 50% of GDP in net present value terms through 2040. Still, hedging its bets for the next 5 years, the IMF notes: “Even under the proposed debt restructuring scenarios, debt dynamics remain highly sensitive to shocks.”

In other words, per IMF, with proposed debt relief, Greece is probabilistically still screwed.

Which, of course, begs a question: why would the IMF not call for simple two-step approach to Greek debt resolution:

  • Step 1: fix interest on loans at zero percent through 2040 or 2050 (placing bonds with the ECB and mandating the ECB monetizes interest on these bonds payable by EFSF/ESM et al). Annual cost would be issuance of ca EUR 2 billion in currency per annum - nothing that would add to the inflationary pressures in the euro area at any point in time;
  • Step 2: require annual assessment of Greek compliance with reforms programme in exchange for (Step 1).

Ah, yes, I forgot, we have an ‘independent’ ECB… right, then… back to imaginative fiscal acrobatics.

One has to feel for the Greeks: screwed by Europe, screwed by their own governments and politically ‘corrected’ by the IMF. Now, wait, of course, all the upset must be directed toward getting rid of the latter. Because the former two cannot be anything else, but friends…

Monday, August 10, 2015

10/8/15: Europe: Where All Do What None Believe In


Here is Bloomberg report on the Finnish Government coalition position on the Greek Bailout 3.0 which, in simple terms, implies that at this stage, no one, save for Brussels and ESM, believes that the Greek Bailout can work. And yet everyone votes in favour of the bailout.

You can't make this up.

Per Bloomberg: "The Finns party, which in April became part of a ruling coalition for the first time, has no choice but to support a bailout since not doing so would cause the three-party government to collapse. That would only open the door for the left-wing opposition, Soini said."

Of course, as we all know, were the Left wing opposition to come to power in Finland, it too will vote for that which they think won't work. Promptly. Without kicking any fuss. Just as Syriza is doing now in Greece.

It no longer matters who, where and why is in power in Europe, as everyone - on political Left, Right and Centre - is hell-bent on doing that which none of them believe in. Except for the Middle Earth of EU 'institutions' who believe in nothing and hence have all the power to do precisely that which they believe in...

Tuesday, July 14, 2015

14/7/15: IMF Update on Greek Debt Sustainability


Predictably... following yet another leak... the IMF has been forced to publish its update to the 'preliminary' Greek debt sustainability note from early July. Here it is in its full glory or, rather, ugliness: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15186.pdf?hootPostID=2cd94f17236d717acd9949448d794045.

As discussed in my earlier post here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/07/14715-brave-new-world-of-imf-debt.html, Greek debt to GDP ratio is now expected to "The financing need through end-2018 is now estimated at Euro 85 billion and debt is expected to peak at close to 200 percent of GDP in the next two years, provided that there is an early agreement on a program."

Which means that "Greece’s debt can now only be made sustainable through debt relief measures that go far beyond what Europe has been willing to consider so far."

Under the current programme (running from November 2012 through March 2016) the IMF projected "debt of 124 percent of GDP by 2020 and “substantially below” 110 percent of GDP by 2022", specifically, the projected debt at 2022 was 105%. Now, the Fund estimates 2022 debt at 142% of GDP.

Furthermore, "Greece cannot return to markets anytime soon at interest rates that it can afford from a medium-term perspective."

Worse, on the current path "Gross financing needs would rise to levels well above what they were at the last review (and above the 15 percent of GDP threshold deemed safe) and continue rising in the long term."

And IMF pours cold water over its own dream-a-little target of 3.5% primary surpluses for Greece. "Greece is expected to maintain primary surpluses for the next several decades of 3.5 percent of GDP. Few countries have managed to do so." Note the word decades! Now, IMF rejoins Planet Reality raising "doubts about the assumption that such targets can be sustained for prolonged periods."

In short - as I said earlier, politics not economics drive Eurogroup decision making on Greece. The IMF is now facing a stark choice: either engage with the euro area leadership in structuring writedowns (potentially also extending maturities of its own loans to Greece) or walk away from the Troika set up (and still extend maturities on its own loans to Greece).

Little compassion for the Fund, though - they made this bed themselves. Now's time to sleep in it...

14/7/15: The Brave New World of IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis


According to the secret IMF report released to the European leaders prior to the Sunday-Monday summits, "The dramatic deterioration in debt sustainability points to the need for debt relief on a scale that would need to go well beyond what has been under consideration to date - and what has been proposed by the ESM."

This is reported by Reuters here.

Per IMF report,that completes the Debt Sustainability Analysis released earlier this month (see the link to the original published report here) and that already concluded that Greek debts were not sustainable, accounting for the effects of capital controls and other recent factors, to address sustainability of Greek debt into 2020s:

  1. The EU (euro area) will need to extend graced period on Greek debt repayments to the ECB and the euro area to 30 years from now, and (not or)
  2. Dramatically extend maturity of debt given to Greece under previous programmes and the new upcoming programme.

Barring the above - which are not in the proposed Bailout 3.0 package - the euro area member states will have to "make explicit annual fiscal transfers to the Greek budget or accept "deep upfront haircuts" on their loans to Athens". In other words - either there will have to be direct aid or direct up front write downs to the debt. These too are not in the current proposal for Bailout 3.0.

Despite this damning analysis, the IMF continues to insist that it will be a part of the new arrangement and will have a new agreement with Greece comes March 2016 when the current one ends. In other words, political arm of the IMF (aka Madame Lagarde and national representatives of the EU) are now directly, head-on, and forcefully in a contradiction to their own technical team assessment of the situation. Madame Lagarde was present at the Sunday-Monday meetings and produced no apparent progress on the what her own technical team says will be a necessary part of any sustainable solution to the crisis.

There is an added component to all of this: IMF analysis refers to a significant deterioration in banking sector situation in Greece since the introduction of capital controls. Which makes sense - there are no new deposits coming into the system and, one can easily assume, loans due are not being serviced. This, in turn, begs a question as to how realistic are the EU-own assessments that the Greek banks will require EUR12-25 billion in capital.

How dire is the situation with Greek debt?

IMF new report projects debt to GDP ratio peaking at above 200% - which is bang on with my estimates previously - up on the previous IMF estimate of peak at 177%. By 2022, IMF estimated Greek debt will decline to 142% of GDP (that is back from the previous 'secret' report linked above). Now, the Fund says debt will stay at 170% of GDP even by 2022.

As Retuers reports, "Gross financing needs would rise to above the 15 percent of GDP threshold deemed safe and continue rising in the long term".

"In the laconic technocratic language of IMF officialdom, the report noted that few countries had ever managed to sustain for several decades the primary budget surplus of 3.5 percent of GDP expected of Greece." In other words, the holly grail of massive and continuous long-term primary surpluses - the sole pillar underpinning previous positive assessments of the Greek debt sustainability by the IMF - is now gone. Realism prevails - no country can sustain such surpluses indefinitely. Surprisingly, IMF continues to insist on 3.5% primary surpluses target.

As a reminder, IMF has called for official sector debt write downs for Greece in the past. It still insists on the same (per technical team), but does nothing from the political leadership point of view.

Conclusion: IMF is now fully torn between its political wing - dominated by the EU representation and leadership - and its technical side. Unlike a unified and functional World Bank (led by the US), the IMF has fallen into the European orbit of dysfunctional politicking and funding programmes that are far from consistent with IMF-own standards. (To see some evidence of this, read this excellent essay from Bruegel). 

IMF's role in the Greek bailout 3.0 will go down in history as a direct participation in the wilful re-writing of the European system of governance to embrace politicised leadership over calm and effective economic policy structuring. As per Eurogroup, there is no longer any doubt that the euro area leadership is wilfully incapable of resolving the Greek crisis. Incompetence no longer counts - the euro area finance ministers and prime ministers had all necessary information to arrive at the only logical conclusion: debt writedowns are needed and are needed upfront. They opted to ignore these so politics can prevail over economics and finance, allowing for subsequent consolidation of the euro area systems and institutions without a clear path for any member state to deviate from such.

Greece is just the first roadkill on this path.


Update: WSJ covers the topic of IMF dilemma.

Friday, February 27, 2015

27/2/15: Of a momentary surrender and a longer fight: Greece v Eurogroup


Couple more earlier comments on Greek situation for print edition of Expresso, 31.12.2015 pages 8-9 and online http://expresso.sapo.pt/os-trabalhos-herculeos-de-varoufakis-mercados-financeiros-a-espera-da-lista-de-reformas=f911931, February 22, 2015.


English version of some of the comments:


# In which points did Greek delegation change its position?

Last night Eurogroup saw significant changes to the Greek Government position vis-a-vis the current bailout. Firstly, the Government has now abandoned its elections promises to achieve a debt write down and end the agreement with the Troika. Instead, the old agreement has been extended until the end of June on the basis of Greece committing to full implementation of the original Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement (MFAFA) and, thus, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The dreaded austerity programme remains in place, despite the Greek Government claims to the contrary. The dreaded Troika is still there, now referenced as Institutions. Secondly, Greece failed to secure control over banks recapitalisation funding. A major point of Government plans was to use of some of these funds for the purpose of funding public investment and/or debt redemptions. This is no longer an option under the new bridging Agreement. Thirdly, the Greek Government failed to secure any concessions on the future programme. The Eurogropup conceded to allow the Greece to present its proposals for the future pos-MOU agreement, but any proposals will have to be with the parameters established by the current programme.


# In which points Germany change its hard position?

So far, Germany and the Eurogroup conceded nothing to the Greek Government. The much-discussed references in the Eurogroup statement that allow for some flexibility on fiscal targets, principally recognition of the economic conditions in computing the target primary surplus for 2015, is not a new concession. Under the MOU, present conditions were always a part of analysis performed to establish deficit targets and the current programme always allowed for some flexibility in targets application. Crucially, Greece went into the negotiations with two objectives in sight: reduction in the debt burden and reduction in the austerity burden. The fist objective was abandoned even before last night's Eurogroup meeting. The second objective was severely diluted when it comes to the Eurogroup statement and the bridging programme. There are no concessions relating to the future (post-June 2015) programme. In a sense, Germany won. Greece lost.


# What do you expect for the list of reforms to be presented on Monday?

We can expect the Greek Government to further moderate its position before Monday. The new set of proposals is likely to contain request for delays (not abandonment, as was planned before) of privatisations, a request for the primary deficit target for 2015 to be lowered to around 2-2.5% of GDP, and a request to allow for some of the past austerity measures to be frozen, rather than reversed, for the duration of 2015. The Greek Government is likely to present new short term growth strategy based on a promise to enforce more rigorously taxation, set higher tax rates on higher earners, in exchange for using the resulting estimated 'savings' to fund public spending and jobs programme. The final agreement on these will likely be in the form of a temporary programme, covering 2015, and possible extension of this programme will be conditional on 2015 debt and deficit dynamics. Beyond Monday, however, a much more arduous task will be to develop a new programme. In very simple terms, Greece still requires a debt restructuring to cancel a significant quantum of current debt. This now appears to be off the table completely. As the result, any new agreement achieved before June 2015 will be inadequate in terms of restoring Greek economy to any sustainable growth path. Both Greece and Europe, today, are at exactly the same junction as two weeks ago: an insolvent economy is faced with the lenders unwilling to recognise the basics of financial realities.  

Tuesday, October 22, 2013

22/10/2013: Keiser Report this week


Latest Keiser Report (E513) show with Stacy Herbert: Irish Bailout 'Exit', Greek Bailout 3.0, UK's China Model and the End of Pax Americana... with my contributions... http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E20ycoQMEpY&feature=youtu.be

Friday, March 16, 2012

16/3/2012: Greek Bailout 2 - Globe & Mail


A quick link to my article on Greek bailout-2 for Economy Lab with Globe & Mail (here) and related subsequent article on ZeroHedge on the same topic (here).


Below is the full version (unedited) of the Globe & Mail article - double the length of the print version.


With the Greek Bailout 2 on its way, has euro zone escaped the clutches of the proverbial markets? Not a chance. Greece remains the eurozone’s ‘weakest link’ and Europe remains the Sick Man of the global growth. The reasons are simple: debt, liquidity and growth. Let’s first focus on Greece, debt and liquidity, with a subsequent post dealing with Euro area growth.

Part 1:
Debt-wise, Greece is now actually worse off than when the whole mess of the second bailout began. After the PSI that, together with the ECB swap, amounts to a $138bn debt writedown, Greece is now in line for $170bn in new loans, an additional $38bn EFF ‘pro-growth’ lending facility from the IMF, and a standing $40bn reserve loans facility for its banks. As of today, the expected Greek banks bailout bill stands at $63bn. Behind all that looms another $20bn yet-to-be-announced lending package that will be required to get Greece over 2012 targets, given the deterioration in its GDP. All in, Greek debt can rise by as much as $130bn with Bailout-2, although the most likely number will be around $100bn. This would bring Greek gross external debt from 192% of GDP projected pre-Bailout 2, to over 225%, using IMF figures.
Keep in mind that Greece cannot print out of this debt, nor can it expect to grow out of it. The Greek economy is expected to shrink -3.2% this year and post just 0.6% nominal growth in 2013. Thereafter, rosy projections from the IMF are for 3.3% average annual growth out to 2016. All of this growth is expected to come from gross fixed capital formation and exports. The former will be happening, according to the IMF numbers, amidst shrinking public and private demand and zero per cent private sector credit creation through 2014. The latter is expected to add 39% to the country exports of goods and services over the next 4 years. German tourists better start coming into Greece in millions, because feta cheese sales doubling between now and 2016 will not do the trick. In other words, the rates of growth envisioned by the IMF are purely imaginary.
On the liquidity front, European periphery remains largely outside the funding markets. Even Italy is now borrowing in the markets courtesy of ECB pumping cash into the country banks. Of the top ten LTRO borrowers by overall volume, seven are from Spain and Italy. Fifteen out of top twenty banks, measured as a ratio of LTROs borrowings to their assets, are from these countries. Since the beginning of 2009, ECB has unloaded some $1.65 trillion of new funds. Much of this went into the sovereign bonds and ECB deposits.
Now, here’s the obvious problem at the end of the proverbial Cunning Plan that ECB contrived to shore up ailing banks. Euro area banks are the largest holders of Euro area sovereign bonds. This reality was the main channel for contagion from the sovereign balancesheets to the banking system of the current crisis. LTROs 1 and 2 have just made that channel about a mile wider. Mopping up the expected tsunami of bonds that will hit private markets in and around LTRO winding up dates in 2014-2015 will be a problem of its own right. Coupled with the bonds redemption cliff faced by some peripheral countries around that time will assure that the problem will be insurmountable.

Part 2:
With the Greek Bailout 2 euro zone did not escape the clutches of the proverbial markets. The reasons are simple: debt, liquidity and growth. While the previous post focused on Greece, debt and liquidity, the current post deals with the core source of the weakness in the region’s growth dynamics.
With Greek Bailout 2, Europe has run out of options for supporting its failing states and in doing so, it has run out of room for its economies to grow. Domestic savings are stagnant and, given already hefty fiscal spending bills and rising tax burdens, availability of private capital will be a major problem for investment in the medium term.
Take a look at some numbers – again courtesy of the unseasonally optimistic IMF. Between 2011 and 2014, IMF predicts PIIGs economies to grow, cumulatively by between 1.7% for Greece, Italy and Portugal, 4.8% for Spain and 5.7% for Ireland. However, in recent months IMF has been scaling back its forecasts so rapidly and so dramatically, that the above figures can become, by April 2012 WEO database revision, -0.1% for Greece, 5.0% for Ireland, 1.6% Italy, 1.5 Portugal and 3.3% Spain. Not a single Euro area member state, save for Greece is expected to see more than 2 percentage point increase in gross national savings. Coupled with fiscal consolidations planned, this implies negative growth in private savings as a share of GDP in every Euro zone country. Over the same period, General Government revenues as a share of overall economy will increase on average across the old Euro area member states (pre-2004 EU12). The much-hoped-for salvation from external trade surpluses is an unlikely source for growth: between 2011 and 2014, cumulative current account balances are likely to be deeply negative in France (-7.4% of GDP), Greece (-16.9%), Italy (-7.5%), Portugal (-15.5%), Spain (-8.2%) and only mildly positive in Ireland (+4.9%). Average cumulative 2012-2014 current account deficit for PIIGS is forecast to be in the region of -8.7% of GDP and for the Big 4 states -1.6%.
This lacklustre performance comes on top of the on-going and accelerating banks deleveraging that will further choke of credit supply to the real economy. Hence, broad money supply across ECB controlled common currency area is declining and ex-ECB deposits, banks balance sheets have shrunk some $660bn in Q4 2011 alone, roughly offsetting the effect of the LTRO 2. You can bet your house the real retail cost of investment is going to continue rising through 2012 and into 2013, exerting a massive drag on growth. Thereafter, unwinding of LTROs will lead to a spike in the benchmark ‘risk-free’ sovereign rates, once again supporting inflation in the cost of business investment.
With all of this, PIIGS are going to be squeezed on all sides – fiscal, monetary / credit, and the real economy – both in the short run and in the medium term. Spain is the case in point with the latest spat with the EU on widening deficits. This week’s news that the EU decided to back down on its own targets for Spanish deficits does not bode well for the block’s credibility when it comes to fiscal discipline. But it signals even worse news for anyone still holding their breath for Europe to show signs of an economic recovery.
If anything, the last two weeks of the Euro crisis are reinforcing the very predictions I made some months ago – Europe’s governments are incapable of sticking to the austerity targets they set for themselves, and are unable to spur any growth momentum to substitute for austerity. In other words, Europe is now firmly stuck between half-hearted dreaming for Keynesianism by default and fully-pledged monetarism by design. As the ‘Third Way’ – this combination of policies is the fastest path to economic hell.

Monday, October 31, 2011

31/10/2011: Europe's latest blunder

This is an unedited version of my article in October 30, 2011 edition of Sunday Times.


This week was a fruitful and productive one for Europe’s leaders. Not because the battered euro block has finally produced a feasible and effective solution to the raging debt, fiscal and banking crises sweeping across the common area, but because they spent the entire week doing what they do best: holding meetings and issuing communiqués.

The latest plan, unveiled this Wednesday, shows once again that the EU remains incapable of actually doing what needs to be done.

The real European disease is debt. Too much debt. Based on the latest IMF forecasts and statistics from the Bank for International Settlements by the end of 2011, combined public, household and non-financial corporate debts will reach 280% of GDP in the US. In France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium, this number will be closer to 330-335%, in Italy – 314%, in Greece – 290%, in Portugal 375%, in Spain 360%, and in Ireland a whooping 415%.

The composition of these debts, and in particular the weight of public sector debts in total non-financial debt overhang, may differ, but the end result is the same for all of the above. Per August 2011 research paper from the Bank for International Settlements, combined private sector debt in excess of ca 250% of GDP results in a long term (aka permanent) reduction in future growth rates. This reduction, in turn, puts under pressure the ability of the indebted states to repay their obligations.

Further compounding the problem, European banking systems have become addicted to Government bonds as a form of capital. In the past, this addiction was actively encouraged by the Governments, regulators and the ECB. With the latest proposals in place, we are likely to see even more Government/EFSF debt piling into the banks in the long term.

Having ignored basic risk management rules, banks across the Euro area are now fully contaminated with their exposures to sovereign bonds that are about as bad – from the risk perspective – as the adjustable rate mortgage borrowers in the US. Based on the second set of stress tests carried by the European Banking Authority this summer, Greek haircut of 75%, as suggested by the IMF, against the core tier 1 requirement of 9% will imply a capital shortfall of €180 billion. Failing to recognize this, the EU plan unveiled on Wednesday calls for just €100 billion recapitalization under a 50% haircut.

This, of course is far too little too late for Greece and for Europe overall. To bring public debt to GDP levels back to the point of fiscal stabilization (under 100% of GDP) will require ca 20% write-down in Portugal, 40% in Italy, and 30% in Ireland. Europe’s problem is at least €730 billion-strong. It can become bigger yet if – as can be expected – Greece fails once again to deliver on prescribed fiscal adjustment measures and/or the write-downs trigger CDS calls and/or the credit contraction triggers by the measures leads to a new recession. All in, Euro area needs closer to €820-850 billion in funding in the form of both rights placements, assets disposal, and government capital supports.


Now, factor in the second order effects of the above numbers onto the real economy.

Injecting €820 billion in new capital or, equivalently, providing some €1 trillion in fresh capital and bonds guarantees as envisaged under the EFSF proposals being readied by the European officials will increase broad money supply by 10%. This is consistent with long term ECB rates rising to well above their previous historical peak of 4.75% - triple the current rate. European banks trying to raise new capital and deleveraging foreign assets will saturate equity markets across Europe with capital demand. Reduced banking sector competition, pressures on the margins and higher funding costs will push retail rates into double-digit territory.

For European companies – more addicted to debt financing than their US counterparts and now competing for scarce equity investors against their European banks – this will mean a virtual shutting down of credit supply. Starved of domestic credit, European multinationals will aggressively divest out of the Continent and pursue jobs and investment growth in places where capital is more abundant – the US and Asia.

As Paul Krugman recently said, “The bitter truth is that it’s looking more and more as if the euro system is doomed. And the even more bitter truth is that given the way that system has been performing, Europe might be better off if it collapses sooner rather than later.”

Sadly, Krugman is correct. European cure proposals to the crises are worse than the disease itself and the Wednesday’s proposals for dealing with the crisis are case in point.

Firstly, banks recapitalizations – first via private equity raising and bond-to-equity conversions, then via sovereign/EFSF funding – risks extending the recapitalization procedures into the second half of 2012 and simultaneously increase the risk premia on banks funding. In other words, credit crunch is likely to get worse and last longer. Most likely, this will require additional guarantees to ensure the funding market does not collapse in the process. The ECB balance sheet exposure to peripheral banks and sovereign debts – currently at €590 billion, up from €444 billion back in June 2011 – will become impossible to unwind.

Secondly, the insurance option for sovereign bonds issuance is likely to be insufficient in cover and, coupled with greater seniority accorded to EFSF debt can lead to a rise in yields on Government bonds. This, in turn, will amplify pressure on countries, such as Spain and Italy which are facing demand for new bonds issuance and existent debt roll over of some €1.3-1.5 trillion over 2012-2014.

Thirdly, leveraging EFSF to some €1 trillion via creation of an SPIV (Special Purpose Investment Vehicle) will create a nightmarishly complex sovereign debt structure.

Under leverage EFSF option, a country borrowing from the fund €1 billion will receive only a small fraction of the money directly from the fund itself, with the balance being borrowed from international lenders that may include IMF. In order to secure such lending, the EFSF will require seniority for international lenders over and above any other sovereign debt issued by the borrowing state. This will de facto prevent the EFSF borrower from raising new funding in the capital markets in the future.

In all of this, Ireland is but a small- albeit a high risk – player with the power to influence some of the EU decisions, especially those that matter most. Alongside the EFSF reforms and banks recapitalizations, the EU will require stronger fiscal and sovereign debt oversight measures, and ultimately closer integration.

The Irish Government should make it clear from the earliest date possible that Ireland’s participation in this process is conditional on three measures. First, Irish banks debts to the euro system should be written down to the tune of €60-70 billion, allowing for clawing back some of the funds injected into banks as capital and providing a stronger cushion for a households’ debt writeoff. Second, we should demand that the debt-for-equity swaps explicitly encouraged as the means for recapitalization of the euro area banks in Wednesday agreement be applied to Irish banks. These swaps can be used to further reduce previously committed funds and reverse some of the debt accumulated by the Exchequer (on and off its balancesheet). Third, Irish Government should make it unequivocally clear that we will veto any tax harmonization in the future.

On the net, European solutions unveiled this Wednesday are simply not going to work. In Q1 2012 the latest recapitalization of Euro area banks and Greece will run out of steam. Next time around, this will happen in the environment of slower growth and possibly a full-blown recession with Spain, Italy and Portugal all running into deeper fiscal troubles. The real price of Europe’s serial failures to deal with the crisis will be the real economy of the euro zone.


Box-out:

This week’s CSO-compiled Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) had posted another 1.49 percent monthly fall in house prices nationwide. Exactly four years ago, at the peak of residential property valuations, RPPI stood at 130.5. At the end of September this year, the index was just 72.8 or 44 percent below the peak. The misery of falling prices is now impacting not only hundreds of thousands of negative equity mortgage holders, but even the all-mighty Nama. Nama referenced its original valuations of the assets it took over from the banks to November 30, 2009. Since then, residential prices in the nation have fallen 29.5% and apartments prices (the category of property more frequently related to Nama loans) have fallen 33.9%. All in, Nama will now require a 35% uplift on its assets (55% for apartments) to break even, not including the organization’s gargantuan costs of managing its assets.

Tuesday, July 26, 2011

26/07/2011: Greek deal will increase Greek debt

Eurointelligence.com today reports that (emphasis is mine):

"Hugo Dixon, at Reuters Breakingviews, did the math on the Greek package, and concludes that the calculation by the European Council and the IIF regarding the projected rate of debt reduction is wrong. He said that Nicolas Sarkozy’s calculation of a 24 percentage point fall in the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio ignores the effect of credit enhancement, which is going to be massive.

Once you include the efforts Greece has to make to secure the rollover deal, the debt-to-GDP ratio rise by 14% to 179% of GDP.

As part of the deal with the IIF, Greece will need to secure some of the rolled over bonds with zero coupon bonds. The four options have different implications for the extent of the credit enhancement. But on the IIF’s own assumptions, the costs of the exercise would be €42bn for Greece to finance credit enhancements for the €135bn of bonds in the IIF’s scheme."

You can read the entire proposal by IIF here. And, by the way - I run through their proposal figures. The massive savings for Greece stated in this are referencing the future payouts that are being saved assuming Greece were to pay full set of coupon payments and principal on its bonds over their history. This is slightly misleading, as the markets have been pricing significant (40%+) discounts on much of Greek bonds for over 1 year now.

Aside from that, the IIF calculations assume 9% discount rate through 2030. This is a strange assumption, given that the deal replaces / writes down bonds with an average coupon yield of ca 4.5% and Greece can borrow from EFSF/EFSM at ca 5% effective rate.

Adjusting for these, my 'back of the envelope' calculations suggest that the actual value of the Greek programme is closer to €26-32 billion instead of €37 billion when it comes to net private sector contribution.

In addition, rollovers to longer maturity, in my opinion, are reducing peak debt levels, but extend payments burden over time, implying that adverse impact of debt on growth and economic performance in Greece are simply extended into the future. In other words, extended maturities do not do much to improve Greek situation. They can be effective if the Greek debt spike were a 'one-off' event. But since debt overhang in Greece is structural (see chart below - showing Greek debt becoming a structural problem around 1993) and underpinned by long term (endemic since at least 1987) current account deficits, extending maturity of debt simply increases life-time cycle of debt overhang.

In summary, there is no substitute to a full default by Greece. The latest 'deal' simply, potentially, pushes this default into 2016-2020 period, and that with optimistic forecasts for growth at hand.

Another can meets the EU boot, and... fails to roll far down the proverbial road.